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John Locke: Theorist of Empire?† 
 
DAVID ARMITAGE 
Department of History, Harvard University 
 
Even twenty-five years ago, it might have been eccentric to ask whether John 
Locke was a theorist of empire. Within the shorthand history of political thought, Locke 
was the grandfather of liberalism; in the standard histories of philosophy, he was the 
exemplar  of  empiricism.  Liberalism  had  long  been  assumed  to  be  incompatible  with 
empire and the main links between empiricism and imperialism were generally found in 
the  work  of  Francis  Bacon  and  the  seventeenth-century  Royal  Society.  However,  a 
generation of recent scholarship has fundamentally revised understandings of liberalism’s 
relation to empire and in particular of Locke’s relationship to settler colonialism in North 
America and beyond.1 The impact of this work has been so widespread that, alongside 
Locke the alleged founder of liberalism and Locke the pivotal empiricist, we now find 
‘Locke,  the  champion  of  big  property,  empire,  and  appropriation  of  the  lands  of 
Amerindians’.2 Locke has finally joined the canon of theorists of empire: but how much 
does he deserve his place there? 
                                                 
† Published in Sankar Muthu, ed., Empire and Modern Political Thought (Cambridge, 2012), pp. 84-111. 
For their detailed comments on earlier versions of this chapter, I am especially grateful to Daniel Carey, 
Tim Harris, Karuna Mantena, Nagamitsu Miura, Sankar Muthu, Kiyoshi Shimokawa, and Sonoko Yamada. 
It arises from my work on an edition of Locke’s colonial writings for the Clarendon Edition of the Works of 
John Locke: I owe special thanks to Mark Goldie, John Milton, and James Tully for their patient support of 
that project. I am also grateful to Tom Leng and Kiyoshi Shimokawa for sharing work in advance of 
publication. 
1  See  especially  James  Tully,  ‘Rediscovering  America:  The Two  Treatises  and  Aboriginal  Rights’,  in 
Tully, An Approach to Political Philosophy: Locke in Contexts (Cambridge, 1993), 137-76; Barbara Arneil, 
John Locke and America: The Defence of English Colonialism (Oxford, 1996); Duncan Ivison, ‘Locke, 
Liberalism  and  Empire’,  in  Peter  R.  Anstey,  ed.,  The  Philosophy  of  John  Locke:  New  Perspectives 
(London, 2003), 86-105; David Armitage, ‘John Locke, Carolina, and the Two Treatises of Government’, 
Political Theory, 32 (2004), 602-27; James Farr, ‘Locke, Natural  Law, and New World Slavery’, Political 
Theory, 36 (2008), 495-522. On the more general turn to the study of empire among political theorists and 
historians of political thought, see Jennifer Pitts, ‘Political Theory of Empire and Imperialism’, Annual 
Review of Political Science, 13 (2010), 211-35. 
2 Jonathan Israel, ‘Enlightenment! Which Enlightenment?’, Journal of the History of Ideas, 67 (2006), 529; 
however,  see  Israel,  Enlightenment  Contested:  Philosophy,  Modernity,  and  the  Emancipation  of  Man, 
1670-1752 (Oxford, 2006), 546, 603-5, for a more moderate admission that ‘it is perhaps not entirely fair to 
depict Locke as an ideologist of empire’: ibid., 604. - 2 - 
What it might mean to be a theorist of empire was profoundly shaped by the 
experience and practices of imperialism in the two centuries between roughly 1757 and 
1960: that is, from the beginnings of European military dominance in South Asia to the 
first great wave of formal decolonization outside Europe. James Tully has succinctly 
summarized the key features European imperial vision in this period: 
 
It is ‘imperial’ in three senses of this polysemic word. It ranks all non-
European cultures as ‘inferior’ or ‘lower’ from the point of view of the 
presumed direction of European civilisation towards the universal culture; 
it serves to legitimate European imperialism, not in the sense of being 
‘right’ … but, nevertheless, in being the direction of nature and history 
and the precondition of an eventual, just, national and world order; and it 
is imposed on non-European peoples as their cultural self-understanding in 
the course of European imperialism and federalism.3 
 
Tully’s immediate example here was Immanuel Kant viewed through the lens of Edward 
Said’s Culture and Imperialism (1993), but accounts of the relationship between Locke 
and  empire  have  shared  many  of  the  same  assumptions.  He  has  been  held  to  be  an 
‘imperial’  thinker  in  all  three  senses:  because  he  placed  the  world’s  peoples  in  a 
hierarchical  order  with  Europeans  at  the  top  of  the  scale;  because  he  legitimated 
European imperialism within a progressivist vision of history; and because he proposed 
European  capacities  –  specifically,  Europeans’  rationality  –  as  a  universal  standard 
against which other peoples were to be judged and towards which they were to be led.4 
On these grounds, there would now be widespread agreement that Locke has as much 
claim to be a theorist of empire as any other proponent of the ‘self-consciously universal 
                                                 
3 James Tully, Public Philosophy in a New Key: II, Imperialism and Civic Freedom (Cambridge, 2008), 27 
(italics Tully’s). 
4  See  especially  Bhikhu  Parekh,  ‘Liberalism  and  Colonialism:  A  Critique  of  Locke  and  Mill’,  in  Jan 
Nederveen Pieterse and Bhikhu Parekh, eds., The Decolonization of Imagination: Culture, Knowledge and 
Power (London, 1995), 81-98; Uday Singh Mehta, Liberalism and Empire: A Study in Nineteenth-Century 
British Liberal Thought (Chicago, 1999). For acute questionings of the assumptions summarized here, see 
Daniel  Carey  and  Sven  Trakulhun,  ‘Universalism,  Diversity,  and  the  Postcolonial  Enlightenment’,  in 
Daniel  Carey  and  Lynn  Festa,  eds.,  Postcolonial  Enlightenment:  Eighteenth-Century  Colonialism  and 
Postcolonial  Theory  (Oxford,  2009),  240-80,  and  Vicki  Hsueh,  Hybrid  Constitutions:  Challenging 
Legacies of Law, Privilege, and Culture in Colonial America (Durham, NC, 2010), 1-24. - 3 - 
…  political,  ethical  and  epistemological  creed’  of  liberalism,  including  Bentham,  the 
James and John Stuart Mill, and Macaulay (to take only British examples).5 
The philosophical distance between Locke and Kant, or between Locke and the 
Utilitarians, should give pause before affirming that consensus, as should the differences 
between the forms and conceptions of empire found in the seventeenth century and the 
nineteenth century.6 This chapter’s argument will be that Locke was clearly a colonial 
thinker. However, it also argues that the label ‘imperial’ cannot be aptly applied to him 
because he did not espouse or elaborate a hierarchical ordering of populations, least of all 
one  that  places  Europeans  above  or  even  apart  from  other  groups,  because  he  saw 
rationality itself as evenly distributed among human populations and the usual markings 
of  civilization  as  contingent  and  fragile.  It  concludes  that  some  of  the  specifically 
Atlantic features of Locke’s thought can be explained by his connections with English 
colonial activity, and that he provided only limited grounds on which later ‘imperial’ 
thinkers  could  erect  their  justifications  for  European  settlement  and  indigenous 
dispossession. 
 
John Locke, Colonial Thinker 
 
There can be no doubt that Locke was a specifically colonial thinker, if by that we 
mean simply someone who devoted much thought and attention to the settlement and 
governance of colonies. He was in fact more deeply involved in the practical business of 
promoting and running overseas settlements than any European political thinker between 
the early seventeenth century, when Hugo Grotius wrote legal briefs for the Dutch East 
India Company, and the nineteenth century, when the Mills worked for the British East 
                                                 
5 Mehta, Liberalism and Empire, 1. For an illuminating critique of this reading of liberalism, see Jennifer 
Pitts, A Turn to Empire: The Rise of Imperial Liberalism in Britain and France (Princeton, 2005). 
6 On Kant and empire, see especially Sankar Muthu, Enlightenment Against Empire (Princeton, 2003), ch. 
5; on the varieties of empire, see David Armitage, ed., Theories of Empire, 1450-1800 (Aldershot, 1998), 
Andrew Porter, ‘From Empire to Commonwealth of Nations’, in Franz Bosbach and Hermann Hiery, eds., 
Imperium/Empire/Reich.  Ein  Konzept  politischer  Herrschaft  im  deutsch-britischen  Vergleich  (Munich, 
1999), 167-78, and James Tully, ‘Lineages of Contemporary Imperialism’, in Duncan Kelly, ed., Lineages 
of Empire: The Historical Roots of British Imperial Thought (Oxford, 2009), 3-29. - 4 - 
India  Company.7  His  first  administrative  position  was  as  secretary  to  the  Lords 
Proprietors  of  Carolina  from  1669  to  1675,  when  he  was  involved  in  drafting  the 
Fundamental  Constitutions  of  Carolina  (1669,  and  later  revisions).8  Among  the 
provisions  of  Carolina’s  first  frame  of  government  were  the  creation  of  a  class  of 
hereditary ‘leet men’ who were tied to the land and the introduction of chattel slaves, 
over whom every ‘freeman of Carolina’ had ‘absolute power and authority’, that is, the 
power of life and death.9 
Locke never dissented, publicly or privately, from the harshest provisions of the 
Fundamental Constitutions, although he may also have played some role in expanding 
Carolina’s boundaries of religious toleration and the protection of indigenous people. The 
Constitutions enshrined toleration for all theists, including ‘heathens, Jews, and other 
dissenters from the purity of the Christian religion’. There is also later testimony that 
Locke opposed another of its provisions establishing the Church of England in Carolina, 
and he may have been responsible for the supplementary laws added to the Constitutions 
in  1671  which  banned  the  enslavement  of  local  Indians.10  The  Proprietors  clearly 
approved of Locke’s work for, in April 1671, they made him a hereditary ‘landgrave’ of 
the colony for his great wisdom, learning and industry in drawing up the its form of 
government and establishing it on the Ashley River in Carolina (magna sua prudentia, 
eruditione et industria tam in stabilienda regiminis forma, quam in Coloniis ad Flumen 
                                                 
7 On Grotius, see Martine Julia van Ittersum, Profit and Principle: Hugo Grotius, Natural Rights Theories 
and the Rise of Dutch Power in the East Indies, 1595-1615 (Leiden, 2006); on the Mills and their milieu, 
see especially Eric Stokes, The English Utilitarians and India (Oxford, 1959), Bart Schulz and Georgios 
Varouxakis, eds., Utilitarianism and Empire (Lanham, MD, 2005), and the chapter by Pratap Bhanu Mehta 
in this volume. 
8 The evidence for Locke’s hand in the Fundamental Constitutions is assessed in J. R. Milton, ‘John Locke 
and the Fundamental Constitutions of Carolina’, The Locke Newsletter, 21 (1990), 111-33, Armitage, ‘John 
Locke,  Carolina,  and  the  Two  Treatises  of  Government’,  and  Philip  Milton,  ‘Pierre  Des  Maizeaux,  A 
Collection of Several Pieces of Mr. John Locke, and the Formation of the Locke Canon’, Eighteenth-
Century Thought, 3 (2007), 260-5. 
9 The Fundamental Constitutions of Carolina (1669), §§ 22-3, 101, in John Locke, Political Essays, ed. 
Mark Goldie (Cambridge, 1997), 166, 180.  
10 The Fundamental Constitutions of Carolina, § 87, in Locke, Political Essays, ed. Goldie, 178; John 
Marshall,  John  Locke,  Toleration  and  Early  Enlightenment  Culture  (Cambridge,  2006),  599-600;  A 
Collection of Several Pieces of Mr. John Locke, Never before Printed, or Not Extant in his Works, ed. 
Pierre Des Maizeaux (London, 1720), 42 n.; The [British] National Archives, Kew (hereafter, NA), CO 
5/286, fol. 41r, Temporary laws for Carolina (December 1671), ptd. in [W. J. Rivers,] A Sketch of the 
History  of  South  Carolina  to  the  Close  of  the  Proprietary  Government  by  the  Revolution  of  1719 
(Charleston, SC, 1856), 353. These ‘laws’ are in Locke’s handwriting. - 5 - 
Ashleium collocandis). Locke never took up his 48,000-acre land-grant and at one point 
tried to sell his title but he never repudiated his collaboration with the Proprietors and 
seems to have taken pride in the Fundamental Constitutions right up to his death in 
1704.11 
By  virtue  of  his  connections  to  Carolina,  Locke  became  the  first  European 
philosopher since Michel de Montaigne over a century before to meet and interrogate 
Native Americans in Europe. In 1670, two sons of the ‘Emperor’ of the Kiawah Creek 
town of Cofitachequi in Carolina travelled to England by way of Barbados. They were 
named, by the English at least, Honest and Just. Little is known about their movements 
before they returned to Carolina in 1672,
 but it is clear that Locke spoke to them before 
he had completed the second draft of his Essay Concerning Human Understanding in 
1671.12 In what is now known as ‘Draft B’ of the Essay, he compared mathematical 
computation to human language and speculated that all counting consisted of only three 
operations: addition, subtraction, and comparison. If a number becomes so large that it 
cannot be redescribed using the names of smaller numbers, Locke argued, it becomes 
impossible to conceive the idea of such an enormous sum: 
 
… And this I thinke to be the reason why some Indians I have spoken 
with, who were otherwise of quick rationall parts could not as we doe 
count to a 1000. though they could very well to 20 because their language 
being scanty & accomodated only to the few necessarys of a needy simple 
life unacquainted either with trade or Mathematiques, had noe words in it 
to stand for a thousand. soe that if you discoursed with them of those great 
numbers they would shew you the hairs of their head to expresse a great 
multitude which they could not number.13 
 
When Locke incorporated a revised version of this passage into the published  Essay 
(1690), he compared the constraints on the mathematical knowledge of the ‘Americans’ 
                                                 
11  Bodleian  Library,  Oxford,  Locke  Manuscripts  (hereafter,  Bod.  MS  Locke),  b.  5/9  (4  April  1671); 
Armitage, ‘John Locke, Carolina, and the Two Treatises of Government’, 608-11. 
12 St. Julien R. Childs, 'Honest and Just at the Court of Charles II’, South Carolina Historical Magazine, 
64  (1963),  27;  Alden  T.  Vaughan,  Transatlantic  Encounters:  American  Indians  in  Britain,  1500-1776 
(Cambridge, 2006), 104; Farr, ‘Locke, Natural  Law, and New World Slavery’, 498; Farr, ‘Locke, “Some 
Americans”, and the Discourse on “Carolina”’, Locke Studies, 9 (2009), 19-77. 
13  John  Locke,  ‘Draft  B’  (1671)  of  the  Essay,  §  50,  in  Drafts  for  the  Essay  Concerning  Human 
Understanding and Other Philosophical Writings, eds. Peter H. Nidditch and G. A. J. Rogers, 3 vols. 
projected (Oxford, 1990- ), I, 157 (my emphasis). - 6 - 
with the similar limits on Europeans’ rational capacities: ‘I doubt not but we our selves 
might distinctly number in Words, a great deal farther than we usually do, would we find 
out  but  some  fit  denominations  to  signifie  them  by’.14  Such  scepticism  would  be 
characteristic of his later writings on the subject. The encounter with Honest and Just 
helped  to  shape  Locke’s  conception  of  Native  Americans’  rational  capacities  and 
prevented  him  from  concluding  that  Europeans  alone  possessed  any  superior  cultural 
self-understanding. 
Between 1672 and 1676, Locke followed his patron the first Earl of Shaftesbury 
in becoming a stockholder and co-proprietor in a company set up to trade between the 
Bahamas and the American mainland.15 In September 1672, he was also named in the 
charter of the Royal African Company, the English monopoly for trading in slaves.16 In 
1673-4, he became secretary and then also treasurer to the Council for Trade and Foreign 
Plantations.17  Moreover,  from  1696  until  ill-health  forced  him  to  relinquish  office  in 
1700,  Locke  was  among  the  first  Commissioners  appointed  to  the  English  Board  of 
Trade, the main administrative body which oversaw the commerce and colonies of the 
Atlantic world. While in that post, he assured a correspondent in Virginia that ‘[t]he 
flourishing of the Plantations under their due and just regulations [is] that which I doe 
and shall always aim at’, and he was always as active in its counsels as his fragile health 
would permit.18 His administrative duties and financial investments over the course of 
                                                 
14 John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. Peter H. Nidditch (Oxford, 1975), 207 
(II. xvi. 6). 
15 Hampshire Record Office, Winchester, Malmesbury Papers, 7M54/232, Articles of Agreement of the 





r;  K.  H.  D.  Haley,  The  First  Earl  of  Shaftesbury  (Oxford,  1968),  232-3.  On  Shaftesbury’s 
colonial vision, see Tom Leng, ‘Shaftesbury's Aristocratic Empire’, in John Spurr, ed., Anthony Ashley 
Cooper, First Earl of Shaftesbury, 1621-1683 (Farnham, 2011), 101-26. 
16 NA, C 66/3136/45, CO 268/1/11 (27 September 1672). 
17 Library of Congress, Washington, D.C, Phillipps MS 8539, pt. 1, Journals of the Council for [Trade 
and] Foreign Plantations, 1670-4; Ralph Paul Bieber, ‘The British Plantation Councils of 1670-4’, English 
Historical Review, 40 (1925), 93-106; Eva Botella-Ordinas, ‘Debating Empires, Inventing Empires: British 
Territorial  Claims  Against  the  Spaniards  in  America,  1670-1714’,  Journal  for  Early  Modern  Cultural 
Studies, 10 (2010), 142-50. 
18 Locke to James Blair, 16 October 1699, in The Correspondence of John Locke, ed. E. S. de Beer, 8 vols. 
to date (Oxford, 1976- ), VI, 706; Peter Laslett, ‘John Locke, the Great Recoinage and the Origins of the 
Board of Trade 1695-1698’, in John Yolton, ed., John Locke: Problems and Perspectives (Cambridge, 
1969), 137-64; Michael Kammen, 'Virginia at the Close of the Seventeenth Century: An Appraisal by 
James  Blair  and  John  Locke’,  Virginia  Magazine  of  History  and  Biography,  74  (1966),  141-69;  Jack - 7 - 
four  decades  earned  Locke  practical  experience  of  English  colonial  and  commercial 
activity in North America, from New York to Carolina, in the Caribbean, Ireland, and 
Africa.19 By the time he resigned from the Board of Trade in June 1700, he had become 
one  of  the  two  best-informed  observers  of  the  English  Atlantic  world  of  the  late 
seventeenth century: only his rival on the Board of Trade, the career administrator Sir 
William  Blathwayt,  had  a  more  comprehensive  command  of  English  colonial 
administration by that time.20 
Locke’s  experience  in  colonial  administration  both  widened  his  horizons  and 
focused his interests. During the closing decades of the seventeenth century, when Locke 
was most involved in colonial affairs, ‘there is evidence of sharpening legal distinctions 
between the Atlantic and the Indian Ocean’. The Board of Trade’s activities concentrated 
almost entirely on the Atlantic world and they considered affairs in the Indian Ocean only 
when they had implications for that arena, as in the case of global piracy, for example.21 
His economic writings provide evidence that his imperial vision was similarly bounded 
by the Atlantic. There is a single reference to the Indian Ocean arena in his economic 
writings, when he implored an antagonist ‘please to remember the great Sums of Money 
...  carried  every  year  to  the  East-Indies,  for  which  we  bring  home  consumable 
Commodities’.22 And Locke mentioned the East India Company only once in print, in his 
Second Letter Concerning Toleration (1690), when he taxed an interlocutor with failing 
to see that ‘Civil Society’ has different goals from other forms of human association: ‘By 
which account there will be no difference between Church and State; A Commonwealth 
and an Army; or between a Family and the East-India Company; all which have hitherto 
                                                                                                                                               
Turner, ‘John Locke, Christian Mission, and Colonial America’, Modern Intellectual History, 8 (2011), 
267-97. 
19 Most of his practical writings relating to colonial matters will appear in John Locke, Colonial Writings, 
ed. David Armitage (Oxford, forthcoming).  
20 Barbara C. Murison, ‘The Talented Mr Blathwayt: His Empire Revisited’, in Nancy L. Rhoden, ed., 
English Atlantics Revisited: Essays Honouring Professor Ian K. Steele (Montreal and Kingston, 2007), 33-
4. 
21 Lauren Benton, ‘Legal Spaces of Empire: Piracy and the Origins of Oceanic Regionalism’, Comparative 
Studies in Society and History, 47 (2005), 718; NA, CO 324/6, fols. 160r-64v, 166v-71r, 175; CO 5/1116, 
fols. 1r-17v; compare Bod. MS Locke c. 30, fols. 62-3, endorsed 'Pyracy 97'. 
22 Philip J. Stern, ‘”A Politie of Civill & Military Power”: Political Thought and the Late Seventeenth-
Century Foundations of the East India Company-State’, Journal of British Studies, 47 (2008), 253-83; John 
Locke, Some Considerations of the Consequences of the Lowering of Interest, 2
nd edn. (1696), in Locke on 
Money, ed. Patrick Hyde Kelly, 2 vols. (Oxford, 1991), I, 333. - 8 - 
been thought distinct sorts of Societies, instituted for different Ends’.23 He did not invest 
in the New East India Company until after he had left the Board of Trade: even then, he 
held on to his bonds for less than a year, and sold them at a small loss in the summer of 
1701.24 
Locke’s imperial vision was comparatively less wide-ranging than that of many 
contemporary  English  political  economists.  For  example,  Sir  William  Petty  gradually 
expanded  his  range  outward  from  the  Three  Kingdoms  of  Britain  and  Ireland  to  the 
Atlantic  world  and  from  there  to  a  conception  of  an  economically  defined,  globally 
dispersed, polity in which all of England’s interests – British, American, African, and 
Asian – would be equally represented.25 No less comprehensive were the analyses of 
England’s East India trade by Charles Davenant and Henry Martyn, who each saw Asian 
commerce  as  crucial  to  England’s  economic  fortunes  and  to  the  elaboration  of 
interoceanic and global trade more generally. On their analysis, bullion taken largely 
from  the  Americas  could  be  exchanged  in  Asia  both  for  luxury  goods  and  for  more 
widely  affordable  commodities  such  as  the  boomingly  popular  calicoes  which  were 
exported from India to England and the American colonies. For Martyn, in particular, the 
import of cheaper textiles from India may have undercut domestic English industry, but 
that was an unavoidable side-effect of comparative advantage to which protectionism 
could  provide  no  solution:  ‘When  we  shall  be  reduc’d  to  plain  Labour  without  any 
manner  of  Art,  we  shall  live  at  least  as  well  as  the  Wild  Indians  of  America,  the 
Hottantots  of  Africa,  or  the  Inhabitants  of  New  Holland’,  he  remarked  sardonically. 
Martyn  drew  heavily  on  Locke’s  comparison  between  the  productive  capacities  of 
England and America in the Second Treatise (II. 41) to support his argument. This debt 
only pointed up the absence of the Asian trades in Locke’s vision of political economy, 
an absence made all the more poignant by the fact that in 1696 Locke missed his chance 
                                                 
23 John Locke, A Second Letter Concerning Toleration (London, 1690), 51. It is therefore highly unlikely 
that the distinctive voting procedures of the East India Company inspired his conception of majority rule in 
the Two Treatises, pace Francesco Galgano, ‘John Locke azionista delle compagnie coloniali (una chiave 
di lettura del Secondo trattato del governo)’, Contratto e impresa, 23 (2007), 327-33, 340-1. 
24 Bod. MS Locke c. 1, fols. 106, 107. 
25  David  Armitage,  The  Ideological  Origins  of  the  British  Empire  (Cambridge,  2000),  152-3;  Ted 
McCormick, William Petty and the Ambitions of Political Arithmetic (Oxford, 2009), 230-3. - 9 - 
to ask ‘a Japonese’ visitor to London ‘whether the importation of gold and silver’ was 
prohibited in his country.26 
The limits of Locke’s imperial vision become even clearer when we compare him 
with other seventeenth-century European contributors to the modern tradition of natural 
jurisprudence.  For  example,  Grotius’s  fundamental  writings  on  natural  law  sprang 
originally from his defence of the Dutch East India Company’s activities in maritime 
south-east  Asia,  most  notably  in  his  The  Free  Sea  (1609),  the  locus  classicus  for 
arguments in favour of freedom of trade across the oceans of the world, and a work 
Locke certainly knew.27 Later in the century, Samuel Pufendorf’s conception of human 
sociability implied a potentially global conception of commercial society linking together 
the peoples of the world through mutually sustaining systems of utility and exchange.28 
This ‘neo-Aristotelian’ vision of commercial sociability found its closest parallel in late 
seventeenth-century  French  Augustinianism,  especially  in  the  work  of  the  French 
theologian and essayist, Pierre Nicole. As Nicole put it in his ‘Treatise of Peace’ (1671), 
using the example of Northern European trade with East Asia: 
 
The world then is our citty: and as inhabitants of it, we have intercourse 
with  all  man  kinde,  And  doe  receive  from  them  advantages,  or 
inconveniencys [de l'utilité & tantôt du dommage]. The Hollanders have a 
trade with Japan, we [the French] with Holland; and soe have a commerce 
with those people, at the farthest end of the world ... They are linked to us, 
on one side, or other; & all entre into that chain, which ties the whole race 
of men togeather by their mutuall wants [besoins réciproques].29 
 
                                                 
26  Istvan  Hont,  Jealousy  of  Trade:  International  Competition  and  the  Nation-State  in  Historical 
Perspective (Cambridge, MA, 2005), 201-22, 245-58; Henry Martyn, Considerations upon the East-India 
Trade (London, 1701), 58, 72-3; Locke to Hans Sloane, 15 March 1697, in Correspondence, ed. de Beer, 
VI, 35-6. Sloane thought the visitor was Chinese, from ‘Emoy’ (present-day Xiamen): Sloane to Locke, 18 
March 1697, ibid., VI, 56. 
27 Hugo Grotius, The Free Sea, ed. David Armitage (Indianapolis, 2004); Grotius, Commentary on the 
Law of Prize and Booty, ed. Martine van Ittersum (Indianapolis, 2006). Locke possessed Grotius’s Mare 
Liberum (1609) in an edition of Grotius, De jure belli ac pacis libri tres (The Hague, 1680), Bod. Locke 9. 
99. 
28  Richard Tuck,  The  Rights  of  War  and  Peace:  Political  Thought  and  the  International  Order  from 
Grotius to Kant (Oxford, 1999), 167-72. 
29 Hont, Jealousy of Trade, 45-51, 159-84; Pierre Nicole, ‘Treatise Concerning the Way of Preserving 
Peace with Men’ (1671), trans. John Locke, in John Locke as Translator: Three of the Essais of Pierre 
Nicole in French and English, ed. Jean S. Yolton (Oxford, 2000), 117. See also Richard Cumberland, A 
Treatise of the Laws of Nature (1672), ed. Jon Parkin (Indianapolis, 2005), 318. - 10 - 
Nicole’s vision of global commerce appeared here only fleetingly but it contrasted starkly 
with  Locke’s  own  conception  of  commerce  which  was  by  default  almost  entirely 
confined to the Atlantic world. Locke certainly knew Nicole’s work, for he translated the 
‘Treatise of Peace’ in the mid-1670s. However, his political economy and political theory 
remained more limited than Nicole’s and his universalism more constrained than either 
Grotius’s or Pufendorf’s in its range of reference. As we will see, this combination of 
cosmopolitanism and regional concentration characterized Locke’s universalism, more 
broadly conceived. 
 
The Limits of Lockean Universalism 
 
Locke  sometimes  joked  with  friends  about  emigrating  to  New  England  or 
Carolina but he never travelled further west than his native county of Somerset. He did 
not  even  see  the  Atlantic  Ocean  until  he  was  56  years  old,  and  then  only  from  La 
Rochelle in France. In this regard, he can be compared to his friend Sir Isaac Newton 
who lived an entirely landlocked life while also acting, like Locke, as ‘a fundamental link 
between the colonial information order and the empiricist knowledge regime forged in 
the ﬁnal decades of the seventeenth century’.30 And yet, unlike Newton, Locke did spend 
long periods outside England, including almost four years travelling in France (1675-9) 
and six in exile in Holland (1683-9). His correspondence likewise comprised a nearly 
world-wide web: among the almost 4000 letters from and to him that survive, there are 
items from the Caribbean, New England, Virginia and Carolina, as well as from Bengal 
and  China,  not  to  mention  extensive  exchanges  with  friends  and  acquaintances  in 
Scotland, Ireland, France, the Netherlands, Germany and Sweden. Among seventeenth-
century correspondence networks, only those of the Jesuit Athanasius Kircher and the 
philosopher Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz were both larger in size and comparably farflung 
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in extent.31 During his years in Europe he collected numerous accounts of the extra-
European world. By the time of his death, Locke’s collection of travel literature was one 
of the largest ever assembled in Britain and it comprised 195 books, many maps, and a 
portfolio of ethnographic illustrations ‘of the inhabitants of severall remote parts of the 
world espetially the East Indies’, which included representations of Laplanders, Brazilian 
‘Cannibal[s]’, ‘Hottentot[s]’ from the Cape of Good Hope, and of inhabitants of Java, 
Amboina, Macassar, Malaya, Ternate, Tonkin, Japan, China and ‘Tartary’.32 
In the course of compiling his major published works, Locke mined his library 
and  pressed  his  global  connections  for  data  about  matters  medical,  theological, 
ethnographical, social, and political. Their greatest impact could be found in the first five 
editions  of  the  Essay  Concerning  Human  Understanding  (1690-1706),  in  which 
information regarding the diversity of human beliefs provided crucial ammunition for his 
arguments against the supposed innateness of ideas. The key test-case for innatism was 
the idea of God. If even that seemingly most fundamental of ideas could not be shown to 
be universal, Locke argued, then surely no other could be said to be inborn, ‘since it is 
hard to conceive, how there should be innate Moral Principles, without an innate Idea of 
a Deity’. He offered evidence to the contrary from the accounts of what ‘Navigation 
discovered,  in  these  latter  Ages’.  Not  content  with  one  or  two  examples  to  combat 
innatism, he continued to add empirical material to this passage and other similar ones 
until in the first posthumous edition of the Essay (1706), ‘the number of authorities he 
had cited had risen to 16 .... The locations they described ranged from the Caucasus and 
Lapland to Brazil, Paraguay, Siam, China, the Cape of Good Hope, and elsewhere’. In 
this way, Locke made greater use of ethnographic information than any other philosopher 
in Britain before the eighteenth century.33 
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Locke’s  knowledge  of  travel  literature,  and  the  information  he  gathered  as  a 
servant of English colonial ventures, encouraged his scepticism about human capacities 
and about the alleged superiority of Europeans. In the early lectures he gave at Oxford 
that are now known as the Essays on the Law of Nature (c. 1663-4), Locke had judged 
the ‘primitive and untutored tribes [barbaras … et nudas gentes]’ harshly, ‘since among 
most of them appears not the slightest trace or track of piety, merciful feeling, fidelity, 
chastity, and the rest of the virtues’. To this extent, he did not distinguish between the 
peoples ‘of Asia and America who do not consider themselves to be bound by the same 
laws, separated from us as they are by long stretches of land and unaccustomed to our 
morals and beliefs [nec moribus nostris aut opinionibus assueti]’.34 This recognition of 
diversity  served  the  purposes  of  Locke’s  evolving  criticism  of  innate  ideas  but  his 
evaluation of that diversity would become more complex in his later writings, starting in 
the late 1660s and early 1670s. His developing arguments in this regard do not easily fit 
the  imperial  stereotype  of  an  imperial  theorist  who  ranked  the  peoples  of  the  world 
hierarchically and placed some within, but many outside, the pale of liberalism. 
It is now a commonplace that liberalism of the kind often traced back to Locke 
was both inclusive and universal in theory, but exclusionary and contingent in practice. 
As  the  most  eloquent  and  subtle  proponent  of  this  view  has  put  it,  ‘as  a  historical 
phenomenon, the period of liberal history is unmistakably marked by the systematic and 
sustained  political  exclusion  of  various  groups  and  “types”  of  people’.35  Among  the 
categories of persons denied the benefits and rights that liberalism theoretically promised 
to all human beings were, variously, indigenous peoples, the enslaved, women, children, 
and the mentally disabled, those whom Locke called ‘mad Men’ and ‘Idiots’. The main 
criterion used to exclude such persons was their lack of rationality, and it has been argued 
that ‘[t]he American Indian is the example Locke uses to demonstrate a lack of reason’.36 
Yet, as we have seen, Locke did not charge Native Americans with irrationality even 
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when he convicted them of impiety, mercilessness, infidelity, promiscuousness, and other 
vices in 1663-4. Indeed, as we have also seen, in 1671 he wrote of the ‘quick rationall 
parts’ of the Carolina Indians he had interviewed in England. 
Only in the First Treatise of Government did Locke ever call indigenous peoples 
‘irrational’,  and  then  solely  as  a  means  of  praising  their  untutored  wisdom  over  the 
sophistication of supposedly civilized nations: ‘He that will impartially survey the World 
… will have reason to think, that the Woods and Forests, where the irrational untaught 
Inhabitants keep right by following Nature, are fitter to give us Rules, than Cities and 
Palaces, where those that call themselves Civil and Rational, go out of their way, by the 
Authority of Example’ (I. 58).37 Locke generally found greater inequalities of capacity 
within  particular  peoples  than  he  did  between  them.  In  this  vein,  he  argued  in  The 
Conduct of the Understanding (1697), ‘Amongst men of equall education there is great 
inequality of parts. And the woods of America as well as the Schools of Athens produce 
men of severall abilitys in the same kinde’.38 The more fundamental difference between 
‘Americans’ and Europeans therefore lay not in their intellectual abilities but in their 
contingent  circumstances,  their  education,  and  their  needs  as  shaped  by  their 
environment. 
Locke argued consistently throughout his works that God sends us into this world 
without  innate  ideas  or  any  of  the  other  physical  ‘conveniencies  of  life’  (to  use  a 
favourite Lockean turn of phrase). It was necessary for human beings to exercise their 
physical and their mental labour upon the otherwise inert creation given to them by God, 
this being ‘the Condition of Humane Life, which requires Labour and Materials to work 
on’ (II. 35).39 Human beings could neither add to nor subtract from the divine creation 
but they had a duty to construct it to their own devices, both mentally and physically. 
What we might call Locke’s ‘constructivist’ understanding of human labour was basic to 
his epistemology in the Essay Concerning Human Understanding: 
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The  Dominion  of  Man,  in  this  little  World  of  his  own  Understanding, 
being much the same, as it is in the great World of visible things; wherein 
his Power, however managed by Art and Skill, reaches no farther, than to 
compound and divide the Materials, that are made to his Hand ....40 
 
It is up to us to furnish ourselves with a stock of ideas just as we must transform nature 
into materials for our use: ‘... it is want of Industry and Consideration in us, and not of 
Bounty in him, if we have them not’ (Essay, I. iv. 16). Thus, even the idea of God himself 
could be lacking, just as physical constructions like bridges or houses will be, if humans 
do not act industriously, if they fail to seize their God-given opportunities, or if they are 
constrained by their own reduced circumstances like the people of the ‘West Indies’: 
 
... nature furnish[es] us only with the materials for the most part rough and 
unfitted to our uses it requires labour art and thought to suit them to our 
occasions, and if the knowledg of men had not found out ways to shorten 
the labour and improve severall things which seem not a[t] first sight to be 
of any use to us we should spend all our time to make a scanty provision 
for a poore and miserable life. a sufficient instance whereof we have in the 
inhabitants of that large and fertill part of the world the west Indies who 
lived a poore uncomfortable laborious life with all their industry scarce 
able to subsist and that perhaps only for want of knowing the use of that 
stone out of which the Inhabitants of the old world had the skill to draw 
Iron ....41 
 
The presence or lack of adequate tools or commodities could account entirely for the 
differential  productivity  of  particular  peoples.  Such  conveniences  are  accidental  and 
external;  they  bear  no  relation  to  the  supposedly  innate  capacities  of  individuals  or 
groups.  
Locke was a thorough-going species nominalist and did not argue for any inherent 
ethnic, let alone, racial difference. Any people could go up or down the scale of civility 
according to the materials nature had given to them: ‘were the use of Iron lost among us, 
we should in a few Ages be unavoidably reduced to the Wants and Ignorance of the 
ancient savage Americans, whose natural Endowments and Provisions come no way short 
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of those of the most flourishing and polite Nations’.42 He also believed firmly in the 
rationality of native Americans and that the advantages enjoyed by Europeans, even by 
philosophers like himself, were accidental: ‘had the Virginia King Apochancana, been 
educated  in  England,  he  had,  perhaps,  been  as  knowing  a  Divine,  and  as  good  a 
Mathematician, as any in it’.43 The lack of those advantages could just as easily make the 
English irrational as Native Americans had become because they lacked certain human 
inventions: ‘perhaps without books we should be as ignorant as the Indians whose minds 
are as ill-clad as their bodies’.44 Locke’s stress on the contingency and the reversibility of 
so much that later thinkers took to be the marks of higher civilization therefore makes it 
impossible to call him an imperial theorist on the grounds that he ranked cultures within a 
progressivist vision of human history. 
 
Locke and the Legitimation of Empire 
 
Locke  can  only  be  described  as  a  theorist  of  empire  in  a  narrowly  restricted 
definition of that term. In early modern usage, the meanings of ‘empire’ clustered around 
two main referents: empire as sovereignty (imperium), and empire as a composite state.45 
Locke  would  certainly  have  recognized  the  meaning  of  ‘empire’  as  sovereignty  or 
imperium and understood it to be territorial in application, as in the passage in the Second 
Treatise where he described how the ‘several States and Kingdoms’ of the world ‘have, 
by  positive  agreement,  settled  a  Property  amongst  themselves,  in  distinct  Parts  and 
parcels of the Earth’ (II. 45). However, there is no evidence he would have understood 
‘empire’  to  refer  to  a  composite  state:  for  example,  the  terms  ‘English’  or  ‘British 
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empire’ appear nowhere in his writings. Nor did Locke anywhere conceive of an empire 
in  terms  that  later  theorists  might  have  recognized:  as  a  territorially  defined, 
hierarchically  organized  polity  which  suspends  diversity  within  unity,  usually  for  the 
benefit of a metropolitan or other central authority.46 He was, in regard to his strictly 
political  theory  (particularly  in  the  Two  Treatises  of  Government),  a  theorist  of  the 
commonwealth, or state, and not a theorist of empire. How, then, might he have come be 
identified as an imperial theorist? 
Three  answers  might  be  given  to  that  question,  two  historical  and  one  more 
immediately textual. The first goes back to the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries 
when  Locke’s  opponents  identified  him  as  a  theorist  indebted  to  the  experience  of 
empire. Critics at that time focused on two particular features of his political theory: the 
prominence of Native Americans in his account of the state of nature, and the centrality 
of slavery to the colonial system imagined in the Fundamental Constitutions of Carolina. 
In this vein, shortly after Locke’s death, his former pupil, the 3
rd Earl of Shaftesbury, 
condemned ‘the credulous Mr. Locke with his Indian barbarian stories of wild nations’.47 
Sixty  years  later,  the  Anglican  apologist,  George  Horne,  later  bishop  of  Norwich, 
similarly objected to Locke’s appeal to the Native American example: ‘This is not a state 
of nature, but the most unnatural state in the world, for creatures made in the image of 
God. And does a polite philosopher, in these enlightened days, send us to study politics 
under  Cherokee  tutors!’48  And  during  the  American  Revolution,  the  conservative 
Anglican  dean  of  Gloucester,  Josiah  Tucker,  argued  repeatedly  that  the  colonists’ 
rebelliousness  sprang  from  their  attachment  to  Locke’s  political  theory.  Among  his 
strategies  for  discrediting  American  revolutionary  ideology  was  thus  to  attack  the 
contractarian  theories  of  ‘Mr.  LOCKE  and  his  followers’  on  the  grounds  that  they 
misleadingly deployed ‘the Tribes of Savage Indians’ as examples of human sociability 
in a state of nature: ‘Let them not din our Ears with the examples of the Savages of 
                                                 
46 Compare Charles S. Maier, Among Empires: American Ascendancy and its Predecessors (Cambridge, 
MA, 2006), 20-1, on empire as ‘a system of rule that transforms society at home even as it stabilizes 
inequality transnationally by replicating it geographically, in the core and on the periphery’. 
47 3
rd Earl of Shaftesbury to Michael Ainsworth, 3 June 1709, in The Life, Unpublished Letters, and 
Philosophical Regimen of Anthony, Earl of Shaftesbury, ed. Benjamin Rand (London, 1900), 403-4. 
48 George Horne, ‘Mr. Locke, Consideration on His Scheme of an Original Compact’ (in an Oxford assize-
sermon originally preached in 1769 and revised c. 1792), in The Reception of Locke’s Politics, ed. Mark 
Goldie, 6 vols. (London, 1999), III, 229-38. - 17 - 
America,  as  being  any  Proofs  and  Illustrations  of  their  Hypothesis;  –  which,  when 
thoroughly discussed, and accurately examined, prove just the contrary’. Locke and his 
disciples,  Tucker  continued,  were  either  ignorant  of  the  true  nature  of  the  Native 
Americans, ‘or they must have acted a very disingenuous Part’ in appealing to them.49 
Shaftesbury,  Horne,  and  Tucker  shared  the  prejudices  regarding  the  capacities  of 
indigenous  peoples  associated  with  the  high  imperial  vision.  The  critical  distance 
between  them  and  Locke  is  further  evidence  of  how  only  with  difficulty  can  he  be 
assimilated to later imperial theories. 
Locke’s critics also accused him of hypocrisy with regard to another subaltern 
people entangled in the experience of empire: enslaved Africans and African Americans. 
Tucker, again, noted that in the Fundamental Constitutions, Locke ‘lays it down as an 
invariable Maxim … “That every Freeman of Carolina shall have ABSOLUTE POWER 
AND AUTHORITY over his Negro Slaves.”’ How could this be reconciled with the 
statement in the opening lines of the Two Treatises of Government that ‘Slavery is so vile 
and miserable an Estate of Man … that ‘tis hardly to conceived, that an Englishman, 
much less a Gentleman, should plead for’t’? So much for ‘the humane Mr. LOCKE! the 
great  and  glorious  Assertor  of  the  natural  Rights  and  Liberties  of  Mankind’.  Tucker 
thought that in this regard Locke was just like all ‘Republicans’, or what we would call 
liberals: that is, in favour of levelling all hierarchies above themselves while ‘tyrannizing 
over those, whom Chance or Misfortune have placed below them’.50 (This might be seen 
as an ancestor of the argument that liberalism as a ‘creed’ is exclusionary by its very 
nature.) Half a century later, in 1829, Jeremy Bentham used the same feature of the 
Fundamental Constitutions to ridicule Locke for his attachment to private property. If 
property-holding were the criterion for political participation, Bentham charged, then its 
reductio ad absurdum could be found among the slaveholders of the British Caribbean: 
‘Property the only object of care to Government. Persons possessing it alone entitled to 
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be represented. West Indies the meridian for these principles of this liberty-champion’: 
that is, Locke himself.51 
The second historical answer to the question of how Locke could be thought of as 
a theorist of empire would be that his arguments were in fact often used in settler colonies 
around  the  world,  and  by  other  theorists  who  promoted  European  settlement  beyond 
Europe, to justify the expropriation of indigenous peoples. For example, in the early 
eighteenth-century context of settler claims against the native title of the Mohegans of 
Connecticut, Locke could be excerpted to argue that the Indians were pre-civil peoples 
who had less right to the lands on which they lived than the more industrious English 
colonists.52 This so-called ‘agriculturalist’ argument gained its greatest purchase in the 
version inflected by Physiocratic political economy propagated by the Swiss jurist, Emer 
de Vattel, in his Droit des gens (1758), which argued that peoples who, ‘to avoid labour, 
chuse to live only by hunting, and their flocks’ pursued an ‘idle mode of life, usurp more 
extensive territories than … they would have occasion for, and have therefore no reason 
to complain, if other nations, more industrious, and too closely confined, come to take 
possession  of  a  part  of  those  lands’.  From  this  argument,  it  followed  that  ‘the 
establishment  of  many  colonies  on  the  continent  of  North  America  might,  on  their 
confining themselves within just bounds, be extremely lawful’.53 Vattel’s arguments were 
widely dispersed across the globe by the circuits of empire in the late eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries; their force could be felt when, for example, the Sydney Herald 
proclaimed  in  1838  that  Australia  was  for  the  Aborigines  only  ‘a  common  –  they 
bestowed no labour upon the land – their ownership, their right, was nothing more than 
that  of  the  Emu  or  the  Kangaroo’.54  This  was  a  theoretical  justification  for  the 
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foundations of property-holding in an imperial context; it was certainly Lockean in form 
but not directly Lockean in origin. 
Like these imperial iterations of Locke’s arguments, the third, textual, answer to 
the  problem  of  Locke’s  identification  as  a  theorist  of  empire  goes  back  to  the  Two 
Treatises of Government. The allusions to non-European peoples in the Two Treatises are 
almost exclusively drawn from the Americas. There are only two passing references to 
Asia in the Treatises, one to the Chinese as ‘a very great and civil People’ (I. 141), the 
other to the deleterious consequences of absolute monarchy Robert Knox had portrayed 
in his ‘late Relation of Ceylon’ (1680) (II. 2) which Locke acquired in 1681.55 Otherwise, 
the historical and ethnographic examples Locke uses referred to ‘Americans’, meaning 
Native Americans, accompanied by occasional references to the creole settlers. Thus, in 
the First Treatise, Locke drew on examples from Peru,56 from the settlement of Carolina 
and the ‘little Tribe[s]’ ‘in many parts of America’, and from ‘our late Histories of the 
Northern America’ to ridicule Sir Robert Filmer’s patriarchalism (I. 57, 145, 154). And in 
the same work, he twice alluded to the ‘Planter’, a ‘Man in the West-Indies, who hath 
with him Sons of his own Friends, or Companions, Soldiers under Pay, or Slaves bought 
with  Money’,  to  disaggregate  two  forms  of  authority  Filmer  had  conflated,  political 
sovereignty and the power to make war, which Filmer had conflated (I. 130, 131). 
The even more frequent allusions in the Second Treatise were likewise almost 
entirely confined to the native Americans. In that work, ‘an Indian’ stands beyond the 
reach of positive law made in Europe (II. 9). When ‘a Swiss and an Indian’ encounter 
each other ‘in the Woods of America’, they do so in a state of nature and hence are bound 
in their dealings by the laws of nature alone (II. 14). The Indians’ family structures are 
flexible yet matrilineal: ‘in those parts of America where when the Husband and Wife 
part, which happens frequently, the Children are all left to the Mother, follow her, and are 
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wholly under her Care and Provision’ (II. 65). A system of absolute monarchy in Europe 
would not ameliorate the instincts of a tyrant from across the Atlantic: ‘He that would 
have been insolent and injurious in the Woods of America, would not probably be much 
better in a Throne’ (II. 92). All political societies began not in natural hierarchy but 
consent, ‘And, if Josephus Acosta’s word may be taken, he tells us, that in many parts of 
America there was no Government at all’ (II. 102). ‘Conformable hereunto we find the 
People of America’, Locke went on, ‘who living out of the reach of the Conquering 
Swords and spreading domination of the two great Empires of Peru and Mexico, enjoy’d 
their own natural freedom’ (II. 105). Such peoples had ‘no Temptation to enlarge their 
Possessions of Land, or contest for wider extent of Ground’ and ‘the Kings of the Indians 
in America, which is still a Pattern of the first Ages in Asia and Europe’ are ‘little more 
than Generals of their Armies’ (II. 108). They did not lack a medium of exchange but ‘the 
Wampompeke of the Americans’ was as incommensurable ‘to an European Prince, [as] 
the Silver Money of Europe would have been formerly to an American’ (II. 184).57 
Fully half of Locke’s allusions to the ‘Americans’ clustered in a single chapter of 
the Second Treatise, chapter V, ‘Of Property’. His first image of the primal positive 
community God had bestowed on humanity before the invention of private property is the 
‘Fruit, or Venison, which nourishes the wild Indian, who knows no Inclosure, and is still 
a Tenant in common’ (II. 26). This is the same Indian upon whom the ‘Law of reason 
makes the Deer’ his ‘who hath killed it’ (II. 30). Such goods show that ‘[t]he greatest part 
of things really useful to the Life of Man, and such as the necessity of subsisting made 
the first Commoners of the World look after, as it doth the Americans now, are generally 
things of short duration’ (II. 46). Accordingly, the ‘several Nations of the Americans are 
… rich in Land, and poor in all the Comforts of Life’ (II. 41), as can be shown by 
comparing ‘[a]n Acre of Land that bears [in England] Twenty Bushels of Wheat, and 
another  in  America  …  of  the  same  natural,  intrinsick  Value’  but  widely  different 
productivity (II. 43). Anyone who ‘plant[ed] in some in-land, vacant places of America’ 
would not be able greatly to enlarge their possessions; even if they did, ‘What would a 
Man  value  Ten  Thousand,  or  an  Hundred  Thousand  Acres  of  excellent  Land,  ready 
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Further Considerations Concerning Raising the Value of Money, 3
rd edn. (1696), in Locke on Money, ed. 
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cultivated, and well stocked too with Cattle, in the middle of the in-land Parts of America, 
where he had no hopes of Commerce with other Parts of the World, to draw Money to 
him for the Sale of the Product’ (II. 36, 48)? From that very fact Locke drew his famous 
conclusion: ‘Thus in the beginning all the World was America, and more so than that is 
now; for no such thing as Money was any where known’ (II. 49). 
The prominence of these allusions to America in the Two Treatises, and their 
accumulation in the chapter ‘Of Property’, were in part the product of Locke’s continuing 
relationship with Carolina in the early 1680s. During the summer of 1682, Locke was 
staying  at  the  Earl  of  Shaftesbury’s  London  residence  at  just  the  moment  when  the 
Carolina Proprietors were campaigning to revive the colony’s fortunes and revised the 
Fundamental Constitutions to make their provisions more attractive to a wider range of 
potential settlers. A printed copy of the January 1682 Fundamental Constitutions survives 
with Locke’s corrections and annotations, and provides evidence that America – and, by 
extension, empire of a specifically settler-colonial kind -- was much on his mind that 
summer.58 The most detailed examination of the composition and the dating of the Two 
Treatises suggests that Locke had begun the Second Treatise late in 1680 or early in 
1681, laid it aside for a while, and then took it up again in early 1682 before completing 
the manuscript later that year. It seems likely that ‘Of Property’ was among the last 
chapters to be written, and that it was written separately from the rest of the Second 
Treatise, a speculation that would fit with the internal evidence of allusions to America in 
that chapter as well as the external evidence of Locke’s involvement with the fortunes of 
Carolina.59 It would also explain why there seems to be a discontinuity between ‘Of 
Property’ and its surrounding chapters, ‘Of Slavery’ and ‘Of Paternal Power’, each of 
which treats non-political power and authority.  
In  composing  ‘Of  Property’,  Locke  needed  to  produce  a  justification  of 
appropriation  which  would  do  double  duty,  both  in  England  and  in  America.  Locke 
contended that ‘God gave the World to Men in Common; but ... it cannot be supposed he 
meant it should always remain common and uncultivated. He gave it to the use of the 
Industrious and Rational, (and Labour was to be his Title to it;) not to the Fancy or 
                                                 
58 The Fundamental Constitutions of Carolina (London, 1682), New York Public Library, call-number 
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Covetousness of the Quarrelsom and Contentious’ (II. 34). Each person has an exclusive 
right to his own body and therefore also of the labour of that body: ‘Whatsoever then he 
removes out of the State that Nature hath provided, and left it in, he hath mixed his 
Labour  with,  and  joyned  to  it  something  that  is  his  own,  and  thereby  makes  it  his 
Property’  (II.  27).  Only  after  land  had  been  appropriated  in  this  way  could  it  be 
apportioned ‘by compact and Agreement’ in those parts of the world where a monetary 
economy had been introduced and land had become scarce, just as the ‘several States and 
Kingdoms  ...  have,  by  positive  agreement,  settled  a  Property  amongst  themselves  in 
distinct Parts and parcels of the Earth’, leaving ‘great Tracts of Grounds’ waste and lying 
in common, ‘the Inhabitants thereof not having joyned with the rest of Mankind, in the 
consent of the Use of their common Money’ (II. 45).60  
The peculiar form of Locke’s labour theory in the chapter ‘Of Property’ marked a 
shift in his own thinking on the legitimate method of individual appropriation from the 
original  community  of  goods  presented  by  God  to  humankind.61    As  late  as  1677-8, 
Locke had offered a broadly Grotian account of the process by which the primal positive 
community  in  the  world  had  given  way  to  the  regime  of  exclusive  private  property. 
Locke argued that that process was contractual and that it was designed to prevent a state 
of anarchic competition for resources:  
 
Men  therefor  must  either  enjoy  all  things  in  common  or  by  compact 
determine their rights[.] if all things be left in common want rapine and 
force will unavoidably follow in which state, as is evident happynesse 
cannot be had which cannot consist without plenty and security. To avoid 
this estate compact must determin peoples rights.62  
 
Such a contractual account of the origins of property could only refer to the agreements 
made between parties equally capable of entering into compacts with each other. In the 
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seventeenth-century context of relations between Amerindians and Anglo-Americans, the 
incomers  did  not  always  recognize  the  indigenous  peoples’  equal  capacity  with 
Europeans to determine rights by compact. However, the Fundamental Constitutions of 
Carolina had implicitly recognised the collective federative capacity of the Indians of 
Carolina when it twice mentioned 'treaties ... with the neighbour Indians' (§§ 35, 50), but 
it expressly banned settlers from holding or claiming any land by 'purchase or gift' from 
native peoples (§ 112).63 The Indians’ sovereignty (imperium) in terms of the law of 
nations was thereby distinguished from their rights of property (dominium), which were 
acknowledged  neither  as  an  attribute  of  their  imperium  over  their  territory  nor  as 
individually transferable attributes. 
Locke's argument in ‘Of Property’ ensured, at the very least, that it would not be 
inconsistent with the justifications for appropriation upon which the Carolina colony was 
founded. A limited range of such justifications was available by the late seventeenth 
century. For example, Amerindian unbelief alone could not provide a justification for 
dominion because, as the Fundamental Constitutions specified, ‘Idollatry Ignorance or 
mistake gives us noe right to expell or use [the Natives of Carolina] ill’. Locke himself 
later upheld just that same argument in his Letter Concerning Toleration (1685): ‘No 
man whatsoever ought ... to be deprived of his Terrestrial Enjoyments, upon account of 
his Religion. Not even Americans, subjected unto a Christian Prince, are to be punished 
either in Body or Goods, for not imbracing our Faith and Worship’.64 Arguments from 
conquest would also have been implausible, for reasons Locke himself made clear in 
chapter XVI of the Second Treatise, especially because the right of the conquest even in a 
just war ‘extends only to the Lives of those who joyn'd in the War, not to their Estates’ or 
to their descendants (II. 182); to believe otherwise would be to deny the two basic natural 
rights possessed by ‘Every Man’: to freedom in his own person and ‘before any other 
Man, to inherit, with his Brethren, his Fathers goods’ (II. 191). For all these reasons, 
there could no legitimate appeal to a right of conquest in the Americas as the foundation 
for English imperium or dominium. 
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The only remaining argument was the contention (derived originally from Roman 
law) that dominion fell to those best able to cultivate the land to its fullest capacity,65 not 
least to fulfil the biblical command to subdue the earth (Genesis 1: 28, 9: 1). Precisely 
that argument underlay the rights claimed by the Proprietors over the land of Carolina, 
according to the terms of their grants from the English Crown. Thus, the original 1629 
grant had called Carolina a region ‘hitherto untilled ... But in some parts of it inhabited 
by certain Barbarous men’, and Charles II reaffirmed this description in his 1663 grant 
which had charged the Lords Proprietors ‘to Transport and make an ample Colony of our 
Subjects ... unto a certain Country ... in the parts of AMERICA not yet cultivated or 
planted,  and  only  inhabited  by  some  barbarous  People  who  have  no  knowledge  of 
Almighty God’.66 This agriculturalist argument was the best justification that could be 
given for colonial dispossession after arguments from contract, conquest and from grace 
had been gradually abandoned, and it was precisely this argument that Locke adopted in 
the Second Treatise. 
Locke amplified the relevance of America to his arguments when he made a final 
set  of  manuscript  revisions  to  the  Two  Treatises  some  time  after  1698.  The  most 
extensive changes and additions he made were to the chapter ‘Of Property’ and sprang 
from his experience as a Commissioner on the Board of Trade in the late 1690s. First, he 
expanded his assessment of the benefits provided by cultivation and enclosure of land: 
‘he  who  appropriates  land  to  himself  by  his  labour  does  not  lessen  but  increase  the 
common stock of Man kind’, by a factor of ten to one, or more likely ‘it is much nearer 
an  hundred  to  one.  For  I  aske  whether  in  the  wild  woods  and  uncultivated  wast  of 
America left to Nature, without any improvement, tillage or husbandry, a thousand acres 
yeild the needy and wretched inhabitants as many conveniencys of life as ten acres of 
equally fertill land in Devonshire where they are well cultivated?’. A few paragraphs 
later,  Locke  made  a  second  addition  which  turned  this  observation  into  a  tenet  of 
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economic reason of state for William III and his ministers. He had originally concluded a 
brief discussion of the multifarious forms of labour that go into the production of any 
commodity with a reflection on the relative unimportance of land to value: ‘So little, that 
even  amongst  us,  Land  that  is  left  wholly  to  Nature,  that  hath  no  improvement  of 
Pasturage, Tillage, or Planting, is called … wast’. In his revision, he went on, ‘This 
shews, how much numbers of Men are to be preferd to largenesse of dominions and that 
the increase of lands [sc. hands?] and the right imploying of them is the great art of 
government. And that Prince who shall be so wise and godlike as by established Laws of 
liberty to secure protection and incouragment to the honest industry of Mankind against 
the  oppression  of  power  and  narrownesse  of  Party  will  quickly  be  too  hard  for  his 
neighbours’.67 
Such encouragement of industry was for Locke a matter of equal importance at 
home in Britain and across the Atlantic in America. Labour, he wrote in an essay on the 
English  poor-law  for  the  Board  of  Trade  in  1697,  was  ‘the  burden  that  lies  on  the 
industrious’. Genuine relief for the poor ‘consists of finding work for them, and taking 
care that they do not live like drones upon the labour of others’. A strict regimen of 
labour would have the benefit of providing education for the children of the poor who 
would be put to work in school, to ensure that they would no longer be ‘as utter strangers 
both  to  religion  and  morality  as  they  are  to  industry’,  perhaps  like  those  natives  of 
Carolina who, nearly twenty years earlier, the Fundamental Constitutions had deemed 
‘utterly strangers to Christianity’ but who were not on that account to be dispossessed or 
ill-treated.68  
These links among the Fundamental Constitutions, the Two Treatises, and the 
‘Essay on the Poor Law’ suggest two conclusions regarding Locke as a theorist of empire 
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that reinforce the evidence from his other works treated in this chapter. The first is that 
his was not a universalistic vision of English, British, or European superiority over the 
rest of the world and its peoples. It did not assume formal equality only for those deemed 
to be ‘civil’ peoples. Indeed, as Locke argued in a little-discussed passage in the Letter 
Concerning Toleration, even a Christian people, uprooted from their domestic setting and 
placed in an unfamiliar and dependent position, would be even more vulnerable than the 
‘pagans’ among whom they settled: 
 
An  inconsiderable  and  weak  number  of  Christians,  destitute  of  every 
thing,  arrive  in  a  Pagan  Country:  These  Foreigners  beseech  the 
Inhabitants, by the bowels of Humanity, that they would succour them 
with the necessaries of life: Those necessaries are given them; Habitations 
are granted; and they all joyn together, and grow up into one Body of 
People. The Christian Religion by this means takes root in that Countrey, 
and spreads it self; but does not suddenly grow the strongest. While things 
are  in  this  condition,  Peace,  Friendship,  Faith  and  equal  Justice,  are 
preserved amongst them.  
 
Charity demands equal treatment for both pagans and Christians, and weakness leads to a 
fragile  tolerance.  However,  the  consequences  of  dominance  and  the  assumption  of 
religious rectitude bring not just intolerance but dispossession and destruction: 
 
At length the Magistrate becomes a Christian, and by that means their 
Party becomes the most powerful. Then immediately all Compacts are to 
be broken, all Civil Rights to be violated, that Idolatry may be extirpated: 
And unless these innocent Pagans, strict Observers of the Rules of Equity 
and the Law of Nature, and no ways offending against the Laws of the 
Society, I say unless they will forsake their ancient Religion, and embrace 
a  new  and  strange  one,  they  are  to  be  turned  out  of  the  Lands  and 
Possessions of their Forefathers, and perhaps deprived of Life it self. 
 
The conclusion Locke drew was Atlantic in form yet more general in application: ‘For 
the reason of the thing is equal, both in America and Europe. And neither Pagans there, 
nor any Dissenting Christians here, can with any right be deprived of their worldly Goods - 27 - 
… nor are any civil Rights to be either changed or violated upon account of Religion in 
one place more than another’.69 
A second conclusion follows from the first: Locke’s theory was non-hierarchical 
and inclusive to the extent that all adult humans possessed the same rationality because 
reason is likewise equal ‘both in America and Europe’ (and China, for example). As 
Locke put it in the Second Treatise, God gave the earth ‘to the use of the Industrious and 
Rational’, with labour as their means to earn title to it; yet the opposite of ‘the Industrious 
and the Rational’ in this passage were not the ‘idle’ and the ‘irrational’ but rather ‘the 
Quarrelsom and Contentious’: that is, anyone who exceeded ‘the bounds, set by reason of 
what might serve for his use’ and unjustly ‘desired the benefit of another’s Pains, which 
he had no right to’ (II. 31, 34). The rational do have a right to possession, but only if they 
exercise their industry and do not invade the fruits of another’s labour. Locke did not 
justify  dispossession  on  grounds  of  any  incapacity,  whether  mental  or  otherwise:  if 
accumulation were pursued within the bounds set by reason, ‘there could be then little 
room for Quarrels or Contentions about Property so establish’d’ (II. 31).70 Least of all did 
he associate rationality with Europeans and irrationality with indigenous peoples. If any 
later settler colonialists sought an argument for indigenous dispossession on the grounds 
of their assumed innate rational superiority, as opposed to their lack of industry, only 
with  some  theoretical  and  historical  difficulty  could  they  have  extracted  such  a 
justification from Locke’s Second Treatise. 
 
* * * * * 
 
This chapter has tried to provide an account of Locke’s conceptions of empire 
based on a full survey of his writings, in line with other recent discussions of his views, 
on slavery for example.71 I hope to have shown that Locke’s thought underwent change 
and that the historical Locke was necessarily more complex and often conflicted than 
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later Lockeans – whether his followers or those who have analysed his work – have 
perhaps given him credit for being. The contextual and conceptual limits both to Locke’s 
theories  should  remind  us  that  diverse  circumstances  generated,  and  necessitated, 
differing strains of what has sometimes been aggregated as a single imperial ‘liberalism’ 
of  which  Locke  is  now  held  to  be  the  progenitor.  There  is,  for  example,  very  little 
concrete evidence for the reception of Locke among Britons in the East Indies before the 
mid-nineteenth  century:  the  Essay  being  read  by  an  East  India  Company  official  in 
Sumatra in 1714; Locke’s works in the baggage of Arthur Wellesley, the future duke of 
Wellington in 1796; and Philip Francis’s knowledge of the economic writings may be 
about the sum of it. In 1769, Warren Hastings had expressed a hope for ‘Lockes, Humes 
and Montesquieus in Number sufficient for each Department’ to govern India through the 
East  India  Company.  He  would  have  been  disappointed,  at  least  in  his  desire  for 
idiomatically Lockean administrators.72 
Yet there can be no doubt that the shape of Locke’s political theory owed decisive 
debts  to  his  experiences  as  a  colonial  administrator  and  servant  of  the  English  state. 
Those  experiences  also  placed  limits  on  his  universalism  and  ensured  that  later 
appropriations of his arguments would often have to reformulate them to fit later colonial 
contingencies. If indeed we are to use the anachronistic shorthand ‘liberalism’ to describe 
Locke’s political theories, then we must be aware that there have been different strains of 
imperial and colonial liberalism and that they have not necessarily been continuous with 
each other. And if liberalism itself is to have the traces of its complicity with empire 
exposed  and  expunged,  that  will  have  to  be  undertaken  in  diverse  and  historically 
sensitive ways to create various post-colonial liberalisms, some of which may be able to 
draw  robustly  upon  other  Lockean  legacies.73  For,  as  Locke  himself  put  it  with 
characteristically overbearing humility in 1692, ‘you wonder at my News from the West-
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Indies, I suppose because you found it not in your Books of Europe or Asia. But whatever 
you may think, I assure you all the World is not Mile-End’.74 
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